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Summary 
The concept of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change is 
relatively recent in international environmental law. Adaptation is not 
defined in the UNFCCC. This paper attempts to address adaptation in the 
UNFCCC from the perspective of reparation under customary international 
law.  It investigates what the concepts of adaptation and reparation have in 
common. Could adaptation in the UNFCCC be seen as a potential extension 
of the notion of reparation under customary law?  This paper investigates 
the relationship between adaptation in the UNFCCC and reparation as of the 
ILC draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts. It does so by conceptualizing adaptation through international 
environmental law principles, the GEF funding policy and the UNFCCC.  
The paper analyses reparation as of the ILC draft articles by considering 
cases, awards, and scholarly opinion. The objective and function of 
adaptation and reparation are analysed collectively in light of the preceding 
findings. The concept of adaptation and reparation under customary 
international law are found to have similar objectives. Furthermore, 
developments under international environmental law, such as the emergence 
of a preventive, rather than simply reparative obligation, are found to 
reconcile adaptation and reparation in certain aspects. However, state's 
policies on funding for adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change, 
as seen through the GEF funding policy and UNFCCC, indicate that there is 
still not enough state practice on funding for adaptation to argue that there is 
international consensus on the legal implications of adaptation. In light of 
this it is clear that today funding for adaptation is far from an obligation 
under customary international law.    
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Sammanfattning 
Begreppet adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change är relativt nytt 
in internationell miljörätt. Begreppet adaptation är inte definierat i 
UNFCCC.  Den här uppsatsen analyserar adaptation  i ljuset av  begreppet 
reparation i internationell sedvanerätt. Uppsatsen undersöker vad begreppen 
adaptation och reparation har gemensamt. Kan adaptation i UNFCCC ses 
som en möjlig utveckling eller förlängning av reparation i internationell 
sedvanerätt?  Den här uppsatsen undersöker relationen mellan adaptation i 
UNFCCC och reparation enligt ILCs draft articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally wrongful acts. Undersökningen görs genom att 
analysera begreppet adaptation med hjälp av internationella miljörättsliga 
principer, GEFs riktlinjer för finansiering och UNFCCC. Uppsatsen 
undersöker också vad reparation innebär genom att beakta internationella 
rättsfall, avgöranden, skiljedomar och doktrin. Syftet och funktionen av 
begreppet reparation och adaptation analyseras gemensamt i beaktande av 
de diskussioner som förts i tidigare delare av uppsatsen. Enligt den slutliga 
analysen har begreppen adaptation och reparation liknande syften. Vidare 
gör den utveckling av internationell miljörätt, som fokuserar på preventiva 
åtgärder istället för enbart reparativa skyldigheter, att begreppen adaptation 
och reparation är förenliga i vissa avseenden.     
 
Dock visar staters agerande i frågor som rör adaptation och ovilja att 
finansiera adaptation att det varken finns internationell konsensus, opinio 
juris eller det enhetliga agerande som krävs för att internationell sedvanerätt 
skall finnas. Det är därmed tydligt att finansiera adaptation i idag är långt 
ifrån en skyldighet under internationell sedvanerätt.   
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Abbreviations 
CDM Clean development mechanism   
 
COP Conference of the Parties for the UNFCCC 
 
GEF Global Environment Facility 
 
ICJ International court of Justice 
 
IEA International Energy Agency 
 
ILC International Law Commission  
 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
 
KP Kyoto Protocol 
 
LDCF Least Developed Countries Fund 
 
NAPA National Adaptation Programmes of Action  
 
OECD Organisation for Economic cooperation and Development 
 
PCIJ Permanent Court Of International Justice 
 
SCCF Special Climate Change Fund 
 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Warming of the climate system is, according to the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), unequivocal and evident from widespread 
melting of snow and ice, ocean level rise and increase of global average air 
temperature.1 Furthermore, there is very high confidence that the net effect 
of anthropogenic activities have resulted in this warming. 2 There is also 
high agreement and much evidence that with today’s mitigation polices 
greenhouse gas emissions will continue to increase over the next few 
decades.3
 
 
What kind of effects might be caused by climate change? The IPCC has 
synthesised studies that have investigated the projected impacts of climate 
change. According to this report, by 2020 between 75 and 250 million 
people in Africa will be exposed to increased water stress as a result of 
climate change. In Asia, by 2050, especially populated mega delta areas will 
be at risk of being flooded from sea and floods. In Latin America, water 
availability for human consumption will be affected. In Europe and North 
America, health risks will be increased due to more frequent heat waves.4
 
 
These are only very few examples of scenarios of impacts of climate 
change. 
There are two main ways of responding to climate change, mitigation and 
adaptation. Mitigating climate change means abating the emission of 
greenhouse gases though measures such as cutting down the use of fossil 
fuel or promoting energy efficiency. Adaptation according to the IPCCC, 
takes place ‘through adjustments to reduce vulnerability or enhance 
resilience in response to observed or expected changes in climate and 
associated extreme weather events.’5
                                               
1                        IPCC fourth synthesis report observed changes in climate and their effects 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms1.html. 
 Practically adaptation includes such 
measures as investing in coastal infrastructure protection to reduce 
2                        IPCC fourth synthesis report, causes of change 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms2.html. 
3                        IPCC fourth synthesis report, projected climate change and its impacts. 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms3.html. 
4                        IPCC fourth synthesis report, projected climate change and its impacts. 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms3.html. 
5 IPCC Fourth Assessment report, Working group two: Impacts, Adaptation 
and Vulnerability, concepts and methods, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch17s17-1.html.  
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vulnerability to sea level rise.6 According to the IPCCC, there are barriers 
limits and cost in regard to adaptation which are not yet ‘fully understood.’7
 
   
An increase in global temperature by at least 0.1 degree Celsius per decade 
is expected ‘even if the concentrations of all greenhouse gases and aerosols 
had been kept constant at year 2000 levels’.8 Adverse effects of climate 
change are upon the world irrespective of what mitigation actions states 
agree to undertake in a post 2012 agreement. Adaptation is therefore 
recognized as a crucial tool in fighting climate change because simply 
limiting emission levels will not combat the adverse affects of climate 
change.9 The importance of adaptation as a way of tackling adverse effects 
of climate change was recognized through the adoption of the Cancun 
adaptation framework by the UNFCCC parties in 2010.10
 
   
  
Parallel to the increasing recognition of the importance of adaptation, 
greenhouse gas emissions from historically smaller emitters are on the rise.  
The traditional major emitters, the OECD countries in Annex One, are 
emitting less than Annex Two parties, economies in transission, and Non 
Annex One countries, the remaining country parties in the UNFCCC.   In 
the recent International Energy Agency report CO2 emissions from fuel 
combustion, it is estimated that CO2 emissions from non Annex One 
countries grew by 6% between 2007 and 2008. At the same time C02 
emissions from Annex One countries decreased by 2 %, ‘causing the 
aggregated emissions of developing countries to overtake those of 
developed countries.’11
 
   
Climate vulnerabilities are unevenly distributed around the globe. Africa, 
for example, is recognised as one of the most vulnerable continents to 
climate change. 12
                                               
6  IPCC Fourth Assessment report, Working group two: Impacts, Adaptation 
and Vulnerability, assessment of current adaptation practices available at 
  
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch17s17-2.html.  
7                        IPCC fourth synthesis report, adaptation and mitigation options 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms4.html.  
8  IPCC Fourth assessment report: climate change 2007, Working group 1, 
The physical science basis available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/spmsspm-projections-of.html.  
9   IPPC third assessment report: Climate change 2001, Working group 2: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, preface, available at 
http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/. 
10  Decision 1 /COP-16 paragraph 11 available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=4.  
11  International energy agency IEA statistics, CO2 emissions from fuel 
combustion higlights, 2010 edition, p.7, available at 
http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/co2highlights.pdf.  
  
12                      IPCC Fourth assessment report: climate change 2007   Working group 2, 
Impacts adaptation and vulnerability, executive summary, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch9s9-es.html. 
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What legal avenues exist for victims of climate change to seek remedy for 
climate change damage? According to article 3 in the UNFCCC  
Parties should protect the climate system in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. An obligation 
to make reparation for climate change damage under international 
customary law cannot be established. The debate concerning the form of 
potential reparation for climate change damage has thus far centred on 
compensation.13
 
 However, the irreversible nature of climate change damage 
challenges the established forms of reparation, such as compensation, as 
investigated by Voigt and Verheyen. Compensation alone does not suffice 
as an instrument to account for the irreversible non financially assessable 
harm that will occur as a result of climate change. 
The administration of the adaptation funding scheme under the UNFCCC is 
currently mandated to the Global Environment facility (GEF). Funding for 
adaptation according the GEF guidelines is provided for incremental and 
additional cost resulting from anthropogenic climate change. As is 
discussed in the second section of this paper, lawyers suggest that actual 
adaptation needs are not adequately covered under the current adaptation 
funding scheme.  
 
1.2 Objective and research questions 
In light of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, the 
shortcomings of the GEF funding policy in addressing adaptation needs and 
the obstacles for compensation as a tool to address climate change damage, 
the concept of adaptation needs to be investigated in relation to the 
established reparative obligation under international customary law. The 
objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the concept 
of adaptation and the concept of reparation under customary law according 
to the ILC.  How does the concept of reparation relate to the concept of 
adaptation?  In investigating this question, several other questions arise of 
equal importance. One of these questions is: What do the concept of 
adaptation and the concept of reparation entail legally?   
  
This paper investigates what is meant by the concept of adaptation in the 
UNFCCC and how it is applied. Adaptation is not defined in the UNFCCC 
so as to understand the practical meaning and extent of adaptation I 
investigate the international environmental law context in which adaptation 
is applied practically. The paper therefore investigates what guidance key 
environmental principles and principles within the UNFCCC can provide. 
The extent to which the GEF funding scheme addresses adaptation needs is 
also investigated. 
 
                                               
13 For example, Voigt and Verheyens articles and dissertations used in this paper have 
focused on compensation. 
7 
 
The paper continues by researching the concept of reparation with particular 
reference to the International Law Commissions (ILC) draft articles on 
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. The objective and 
function of reparation in the ILC draft articles are investigated by 
considering cases and awards. The extent of reparation in relation to 
environmental damage is also investigated. The difficulties of awarding 
compensation as reparation for climate change damage are discussed.  
 
Finally, what do the concept reparation and adaptation have in common? 
What sets these two concepts apart? The concepts of reparation and 
adaptation are compared. Could adaptation be seen as an extension or form 
of reparation? I investigate what factors reconcile adaptation as an extension 
of reparation, and what factors resist such a conclusion.  
  
1.3 Structure 
This paper is divided into five sections. Section one is introductory. The 
following three sections are both descriptive and analytical. Section two 
focuses on key environmental law principles and what their relevance is for 
the interpretation of the concept of adaptation both under the UNFCCC and 
under international customary law. The third section focuses on how and in 
what ways adaptation in the UNFCCC is applied. In this connection the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) funding policy is analyzed. In the fourth 
section of this paper the objective, function and extent of reparation 
according to the ILC draft articles are discussed. In the fifth section of this 
paper the preceding investigations are analyzed collectively. 
  
1.4 Theory and method 
This paper conceptualizes adaptation through international environmental 
law principles, the UNFCCC and the GEF funding policy. It investigates 
what reparation entails as of the ILC draft articles by considering cases, 
awards and scholarly opinion.  The findings of these investigations are 
analyzed so as to investigate the relationship between reparation according 
to the ILC draft articles and adaptation in the UNFCCC. 
 
The sources used in the second section are both primary and secondary. The 
UNFCCC is used as a point of departure but articles, dissertations and court 
cases are also used. The material in the third section of the paper was 
difficult to find. The GEF funding guidelines have at times been difficult to 
understand and get an overview of. Email correspondence with the GEF was 
necessary at one point. Because of the difficulty of navigating in the vast 
material on the GEF funding guidelines, secondary sources, in the form of 
articles have been of help. I have tried to avoid using too many articles. 
However, the accuracy of the factual content in the articles has been 
verifiable. This paper does not aim at investigating the GEF funding policy 
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as such. The GEF funding policy, mandated through the UNFCCC is only 
relevant to the extent that it can provide some guidance as to the legal 
conceptualization of the concept of adaptation. Analyzing the GEF funding 
policy in relation to adaptation itself could fill a thesis. Nevertheless, it has 
been necessary to understand the funding policy because the GEF is 
mandated through the UNFCCC.  
 
The material in the fourth section of the paper range from International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) judgments to articles published in legal journals. I 
have tried to begin my investigation by first discussing the primary sources 
and consider the secondary sources only subsequently.  
1.5   Delimitations 
According to the ICJ statute, there are four sources of international law.14
 
 
Only the second source, international custom, will be considered in this 
paper. The first source, international conventions, will not be investigated in 
relation to reparation because treaties are only binding upon the parties and 
this paper does not aim at investigating state specific relationships. As to 
international custom, my analysis in this paper presupposes that the ILC’s 
work in an authoritative indication of the world’s view on state 
responsibility. Due to space constrains my investigation will therefore 
consider the ILC draft articles. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the 
concept of adaptation and the concept of reparation under customary law 
according to the ILC. An obligation to make reparation for climate change 
damage under international customary law cannot yet be established. The 
main convention on climate change, the UNFCCC, does not stipulate that 
major emitters of greenhouse gas emissions are obligated to compensate 
smaller or non-emitters for climate change damage. This paper does not 
presuppose that such an obligation could be established either. Establishing 
state responsibility for climate change damage is an interesting and 
important study. Nevertheless, it falls outside the objective of this thesis. It 
is not within the scope of this paper to discuss if or on what grounds climate 
change damage could constitute an internationally wrongful act.  
 
 
  
 
                                               
14  ICJ statute 38 (1) a. international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
 b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law.  
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2 Key environmental law  
principles 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Adaptation is, as discussed in the third section of this paper, not defined in 
the UNFCCC.15 Instead, the definition and scope of adaptation in the 
UNFCCC can be understood from the context in which it is applied.  This 
section outlines the guiding principles in the UNFCCC and principles in 
environmental law which are relevant for climate change damage.16 The 
function of the guiding principles within the UNFCCC is to guide the 
implementation of the convention in reaching its objective through 
provisions.17
 
 By considering the concept of adaptation in light of the 
guiding principles in the UNFCCC, the no harm principle and polluter pays 
principle, a basis is prepared for the subsequent investigation of the 
relationship between reparation and adaptation in the UNFCCC framework.        
Principles within international law are ‘soft law’, instruments that do not 
stipulate legal obligations, but which play determining roles in interpreting 
and guiding legislation.18 Distinguishing between rules and principles in this 
sense allows the conclusion that ‘principles embody legal standards but the 
standards they contain are more general than commitments and do not 
specify particular actions unlike rules.’19
 
 Because climate change law is still 
an emerging field in international law, environmental law principles can 
provide helpful guidance for the identification and development of concepts 
in climate change law.  
One such environmental law principle is the concept of common concern. 
This concept can provide a starting point for understanding state 
responsibility in relation to international environmental law. According to 
this concept certain matters should be of concern to humanity and the 
International community as a whole.20
                                               
15  See below in section 3, Adaptation in the UNFCCC framework, p.15.  
 Brunnee argues that the identification 
16  Principles have been selected from the UNFCCC and with the help of 
Voigts investigation in the article State responsibility for climate change damage and 
Verheyens dissertation Climate Change Damage and International law. 
17   Article 3 UNFCCC.   
18  Sands, Principles of International Environmental law, p.234, 2nd edition 
Cambridge university press (2003).   
19  Bodansky , The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change; a Commentary, 18 Yale journal of international law 451 at 501 (1993).   
 
20  Brunnee, The Stockholm declaration and the structure processes of 
International Environmental law, p.4, (2009) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1437707.   
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of  a common concern can limit state sovereignty over natural resources ’if 
it creates or aggravates a common concern.’ 21  If a state through its usage of 
natural resources has aggravated a common concern, state responsibility for 
such action might arise because the state could be said to have violated an  
erga omnes obligation. The concept of common concern therefore arguably 
connects international state responsibility to international environmental 
law. 22
 
 
It is against the backdrop of the concept of common concern and the 
Stockholm declaration that the UNFCCC stipulates that certain principles 
shall be guiding within the framework.23
 
 This section focuses on two of the 
guiding principles, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility 
and the precautionary principle. In addition, the polluter pays principle and 
the no harm principle, which are not mentioned in the UNFCCC, are 
discussed.  
 
2.2   The principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility 
  
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility is incorporated 
into, among other environmental law instruments, the Rio declaration.24
The Parties should protect the climate system… on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities… the developed country Parties should take the lead 
in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.  
  In 
the UNFCCC it is mentioned in article 3  
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility could be said to 
consist of three elements; the first concerns common responsibility of all 
states, the second concerns the need to take account of differing 
circumstances, and the third stipulates solidarity between states.25
                                               
21  Brunnee, The Stockholm declaration and the structure processes of 
International Environmental law, p.14, (2009) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1437707. 
 The 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility therefore allocates 
responsibility according to the individual state’s contribution to the creation 
22   Ibid. 
 
23  Preamble to UNFCCC states ‘Recalling the pertinent provisions of the 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at 
Stockholm on 16 June 1972.’ 
24  Rio declaration article 7. 
25   Sands, Principles of International environmental Law, p.286, 2nd edition 
Cambridge University Press (2003).  
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of the particular environmental problem, and its ability to prevent, reduce 
and control the related threat. 26
In the context of climate change arguably the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility allocates responsibility and burden sharing 
according to historical green house gas emissions. An example of this is 
manifested in article 4.3 in the UNFCCC  
 
The developed country Parties and the economies in transition included in 
Annex II shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the 
agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with 
their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1. 
 
Birnie and Boyle argue that article 4.3 illustrates the third element of the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility; solidarity.27 To 
ensure solidarity the developing countries efforts are dependent on 
assistance from the developed countries. By doing so ‘it becomes irrelevant 
whether developed states have a legal duty to provide assistance’ because 
the developing countries commitments are only fulfilled if the developed 
country parties meet their commitments.28
 
   
As one of the guiding principles in the UNFCCC the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibility becomes relevant in respect to adaptation 
measures as well. To what extent however, is not clear. In this regard 
Dellink et al argue that as ‘for adaptation, the primary burden sharing 
problem will be to allocate funding responsibilities to richer countries to 
fund adaptation efforts in poorer countries.’29
 
 
However, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility is 
merely a principle and not a rule of conduct under international customary 
law.30  Considering the role of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility under international treaty is not within the objective of this 
paper. Although the principle is included in the UNFCCC it is still argued to 
be ‘unclear’, and therefore ‘unhelpful’ to include in environmental 
agreements. 31
  
 
  
 
                                               
26  Ibid.  
27  Birnie & Boyle & Redgwell, International law and the environment, p.135, 
3rd edition, Oxford University Press (2009).   
28  Ibid.   
29  Dellink et al, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities for adaptation 
financing: an assessment of the contributions of countries, The Institute for environmental 
studies (IVM) working paper, p.3 (2009)  
30  Brunnee, The Stockholm declaration and the structure processes of 
International Environmental law, p.14, (2009) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1437707.  
31   Ibid. 
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2.3 The precautionary principle   
The precautionary principle is a guiding principle in the UNFCCC.32
 
 The 
precautionary principle is mentioned in article 3.3   
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the 
lowest possible cost.   
 
 
In the context of climate change damage, the precautionary principle might 
prove instrumental to assess at what point state liability arises. It is therefore 
argued that the ‘main effect of the principle is to lower the standard of proof 
of risk.’33
 
  
If one effect of the precautionary principle in the context of climate change 
is to prompt preventive action in case of scientific uncertainty, inability to 
curb green house gas emissions cannot be excused with reference to 
inconclusive scientific results. In the cases of environmental irreversible 
harm, the preventive approach might play a significant role. The Gabcikovo 
Nagymaros case illustrates one such example in which an early form of 
precautionary principle was key.34 In its judgment, the ICJ asserted that 
‘vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible 
character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in 
the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.’35  Moreover 
‘owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for 
mankind - for present and future generations ... new norms have to be taken 
into consideration, and such  new standards given proper weight, not only 
when States contemplate new activities but also when continuing with 
activities begun in the past.’ 36
 
 
                                               
32  Defined as such in article 3.3 UNFCCC. 
33 Birnie & Boyle & Redgwell, International law and the environment, p.164, 
3rd edition, Oxford University Press (2009).   
    
34  Sands, Principles of International environmental Law, p.275, 2nd edition 
Cambridge University Press (2003).   
   
35  International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros 
Project, p.146 (1997) available through http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf. 
 
 
36  International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros 
Project, p.146 (1997) available through http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf. 
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As is discussed in the analysis, the precautionary principle illustrates a trend 
in environmental law similar to the objective of adaptation; minimising 
inevitable consequences resulting from a harmful act.  
  
 
 
 
2.4 The Polluter Pays Principle 
 
The polluter pays principle is an economic principle originating in a series 
of recommendations first adopted by the OECD countries in 1972.37 It is not  
mentioned in the UNFCCC. Its main function is to allocate the costs of 
pollution borne by public authorities.  The principle provides that the 
responsibility of cleanup costs in case of environmental damage lie with the 
polluter. One interpretation of the principle states that victims of pollution 
have a right to certain acceptable state of environment.38  In the event that 
the environment cannot be brought back to such an acceptable state, as is 
the case with climate change damage, it is argued that ‘the polluter pays 
principle may be extended to include the principle of compensation.’39   
Such an application of the polluter pays principle would also draw upon 
other principles, such as the no harm principle. 40 Therefore, Dellink et al 
suggest, ‘compensating victims for damages caused by climate change is 
one extension of the polluter pays principle with respect to adaptation 
costs.’41
 
   
However, the polluter pays principle is not recognized as a measure of 
responsibility between states in international law. 42
  
 This limitation is 
investigated further in the analysis.   
                                               
37   Recommendation no. 89 of the Council on Guiding principles concerning 
International Economic aspects of environmental policies, paragraph A section 4 "The 
principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control measures to 
encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to avoid distortions in 
international trade and investment is the so-called Polluter-Pays Principle. This principle 
means that the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the above-mentioned 
measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable 
state." Available at http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008-574/008-574.html. 
   
38  Dellink et al, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities for adaptation 
financing: an assessment of the contributions of countries, The Institute for environmental 
studies (IVM) working paper, p.5 (2009).  
39  Ibid.  
40  Ibid. 
41  Dellink et al, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities for adaptation 
financing: an assessment of the contributions of countries, The Institute for environmental 
studies (IVM) working paper, p.6 (2009).  
42   Verheyen, Climate change damage and International law, p. 72, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (2005). 
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Furthermore, the legal significance of the polluter pays principle is debated. 
Boyle argues that the wording of the polluter principle in the Rio declaration 
is not of such normative character to give rise to a legally binding 
obligation.43   Furthermore, implementation of the polluter pays principle 
has often remained with national authorities resulting in civil liability 
influencing the application of the polluter pays principle. 44 Using civil 
liability to apply the polluter pays principle includes considerations such as 
negligence and foreseeability of harm.45
 
  
Another problem with the application of the polluter pays principle is its 
failure to indicate on what grounds to identify polluters. In the case of a 
polluting oil tanker, a broad definition of this term would stipulate that the 
operator of the oil tanker is the polluter whereas a narrow definition would 
point to the cargo owner.46 Due to this ambiguity, the polluter pays principle 
cannot ‘be treated as a rigid rule of universal application.’47 In the context of 
climate change damage, this ambiguity adds to the already existing 
difficulty of establishing causality. As is discussed in the third section of 
this paper, establishing specific causality for climate change damage is 
complex. If the polluter pays principle does not clearly identify who the 
polluter is, then establishing causality using the polluter pays principle 
cannot be accomplished by simply establishing causality between climate 
change damage and the emitter of green house gases. Therefore, the polluter 
pays principle might in the context of climate change damage merely lead to 
more complexities. Without further definition, Boyle argues that the polluter 
pays principle cannot supply further guidance to national and international 
liability. 48
2.5 The no harm principle 
   
The no harm principle, also known as the no harm rule, is one of the 
cornerstones in international customary law.   
 
The status of the no harm principle as part of international customary law 
has been confirmed in a number of cases before the ICJ, most recently in the 
advisory opinion of Nuclear Tests case. The Nuclear Test case illustrates 
how the no harm principle can provide a starting point when considering 
compensation for climate change damage. Australia claimed that France had 
violated the right of each state to be free of radioactive matter on her 
                                               
43  Boyle, Polluter pays, article in  Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International law,  2010 available at www.mpepil.com. 
44  Boyle, Polluter pays, article in  Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International law,  2010 available at www.mpepil.com.  
45  Boyle, Polluter pays,  article in  Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International law,  2010 available at www.mpepil.com.  
46  Boyle, Polluter pays, article in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International law,  2010 available at www.mpepil.com.  
47  Boyle, Polluter pays, article in   Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International law,  2010 available at www.mpepil.com. 
48  Boyle, Polluter pays, article in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International law, paragraph 13 (2010) available at www.mpepil.com. 
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territory arising from the French nuclear test. Commentators suggest that the 
court sidestepped the real issue by simply concluding that a unilateral 
declaration from France (saying that the test would end) made any further 
judicial action from the court unnecessary.49
 
 The court stated in its 
judgement that 
‘The general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other states or of areas 
beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law 
relating to the environment.’50
 
 
However, as Voigt points out, the no harm rule as customary rule ‘has the 
disadvantage of vagueness.’51 If the rule prohibits any kind of harm, the 
harmful activity itself is irrelevant; if the rule is only applicable to certain 
kinds of activities, harm itself is not prohibited.52 This means that harm 
itself may not be prohibited by the no harm rule. The exact scope of the no 
harm rule remains unclear. This concern was addressed by the ILC in draft 
articles on Prevention of Transboundary harm from Hazardous activities 53 
The draft articles specifically apply ‘to activities not prohibited under 
international law’ but which involve a risk of causing significant 
transboundary harm.’54
 
 
Nevertheless, the potential relevance of the no harm principle in the context 
of climate change damage is highlighted further in the Corfu Channel case. 
In the Corfu Channel case, British destroyers struck mines in the Corfu 
channel, part of Albanian territory.  The UK requested the court to assess 
whether Albania was liable to pay compensation. The court held that the 
laying of the minefield could not have been accomplished without the 
knowledge of Albania, and therefore a duty to notify ships of the mines 
arose. The court based its conclusion on ‘every State's obligation not to 
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of 
other States.’55
                                               
49  Okidi, Nuclear Tests case, p.13, Judicial decisions on matters related to the 
environment , International decisions volume 1(1998) available at  
 Because it had failed in fulfilling this obligation, Albania 
http://www.unep.org/padelia/publications/Jud.dec.%20pre(Int%20.pdf. 
50  International court of Justice, Nuclear weapons case, report  241, 
paragraph 29 (1996) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=e1&p3=4&case=95.  
51  Voigt, State responsibility for climate change damages, p. 8, Nordic 
Journal of international law 77 (2008) 1-22.  
52  Ibid.  
    
53  Ibid. 
   
54  ILC draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
activities, article 1 ‘the present articles apply to activities not prohibited by international 
law which involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm through their physical 
consequences.’ 
 
55   International Court of Justice, Judgment in Corfu Channel Case, p.22 
(1949).   
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had committed an internationally wrongful act. 56
 
 The court particularly 
stressed that no effort had been made to alert the United Kingdom of the 
mines. 
In the context of climate change damage, claims could be based on the lack 
of state control over activities within its jurisdiction. Therefore, the Corfu 
Channel Case provides an interesting platform from which to argue State 
responsibility arises from failure to regulate harmful industry.     
 
As is outlined in the section on compensation in this paper, the direct 
applicability of the no harm principle in the context of climate change 
damage is restrained by a number of factors.    
 
  
 
  
2.6 Discussion 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility and the 
precautionary principle discussed above are not easily applicable in the 
context of adaptation funding. 
 
Although the principle of common but differentiated responsibility does 
allocate responsibility according to historic emissions, and stipulates that 
developed countries take a lead, it is not mentioned in direct connection to 
adaptation in the UNFCCC.57   The precautionary principle arguably lowers 
the standard of proof of risk that greenhouse gas emissions cause 
irreversible damage to the environment. A preventive approach to 
environmental damage causing irreversible harm was recognised in the 
Gabcikovo Nagymaros case. Furthermore, the court held that  although not 
the present case, environmental concerns might very well constitute the 
‘objective existence of a peril’ to preclude wrongfulness of an act.58
 
   
Similarly, the no harm principle and the polluter pays principle provide a 
starting point for investigating adaptation and climate change damage, but 
do not apply without limitations. The polluter pays principle is not 
incorporated in the UNFCCC.  Furthermore, the polluter pays principle is 
not recognized a measure of responsibility between states under customary 
international law.59
                                               
56  International Court of Justice, Judgment in Corfu Channel Case, p.23 
(1949).   
  For the polluter pays principle to be recognized as a 
measure between states, it would have to be directly included in a treaty. As 
57  That developed countries should take a lead is seen in article 4.3 
UNFCCC, discussed above. 
58   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, article 25 1 (a) the only 
means of the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril. 
59  Verheyen, Climate change damage and International law, p. 72, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (2005). 
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of today, the polluter pays principle is primarily a soft law instrument 
criticized for lack of clear definition.  
 
Moreover, implementing the polluter pays principle is left to national 
legislation resulting in actual regulation being dependent on national 
legislation. As a result, there is no uniform interpretation of the polluter 
pays principle.  
 
The no harm principle is part of international customary law, as confirmed 
in the Corfu Channel Case and the Nuclear Tests case. Although it asserts 
that states must not allow actions within their jurisdiction or control to harm 
the territory of another state, the scope of the principle remains unclear, as 
discussed by Voigt.  The difficulties in applying the no harm principle are 
examined in more detail in relation to compensation in the third section of 
this paper. 
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3  Adaptation in the UNFCCC  
3.1 Introduction  
The UNFCCC does not define adaptation. The closest definition of 
adaptation can be found in the Cancun Adaptation framework. According to 
this framework, adaptation measures are aimed at ‘at reducing vulnerability 
and building resilience.’60
 
 
This section tries to understand the concept of adaptation by conceptualizing 
adaptation through the GEF funding policy. Because the UNFCCC does not 
define adaptation the concept of adaptation must instead be understood 
through its practice and function under the UNFCCC funding scheme. In the 
previous section, the guiding principles in the UNFCCC were analysed so as 
to shed light on what adaptation in the UNFCCC entails. Similarly, in this 
section, the funding policy of the GEF is analysed to understand the concept 
of adaptation.  
     
The UNFCCC provides a starting point from which to conceptualize 
adaptation legally. As of today, there exists no quantifiable obligation to 
finance adaptation under the UNFCCC framework. Adaptation funding is 
entirely dependent on voluntary contributions. Since the objective of the 
UNFCCC is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system, efforts have for long focused on mitigation rather than 
adaptation.61
 
 With the adoption of the Cancun adaptation framework this is 
likely to change.   
Given varying climate vulnerabilities and capacity to adapt to climate 
change, the discussion on adaptation has mostly focused on adaptation to 
the adverse effects of climate change.62
 
 Adverse effects are defined in article 
1 UNFCCC as 
changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change 
which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or 
productivity of natural and manage ecosystems or on the operation of socio-
economic systems or on human health and welfare.63
 
 
For the purposes of this paper adaptation will refer to the commitments in 
article 4.4 relating to adverse effects. 
 
                                               
60  Decision 1 /CP-16 paragraph 11 available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=4.  
61  Article 2 UNFCCC. 
62  Example is found in article 4.4 of the UNFCCC. 
63  Article 1 UNFCCC. 
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The term adaptation appears five times in the UNFCCC text.64
 
  Whereas 
article 4.1 b and 4.1e mention ‘adequate adaptation’ and ‘cooperating in 
adaptation’, article 3.3 focus on adaptation in relation to the precautionary 
principle. It is only in article 4.4 that adaptation is mentioned in connection 
to the need to respond to varying climate vulnerabilities and the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility 
 The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in 
Annex II shall assist the developing country Parties that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of 
adaptation to those adverse effects 
  
The financial resources mentioned in article 4.3, stemming from the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility discussed in the 
preceding section, are provided through the setup of a financial mechanism 
according to article 11. The operation of the financial mechanism is 
entrusted to the GEF in article 21.3 in the UNFCCC.   
 
The recently adopted Cancun adaptation framework commits parties to the 
setup of an additional fund, the Green climate fund, also under article 11 of 
the UNFCCC.65 This fund is going to be administered by the World Bank 
acting as the ‘interim trustee’ for the first three years.66
 
 The organizational 
details of Green Climate Fund are yet to be finalised and no funding has yet 
been provided for adaptation. Therefore, the Green Climate change Fund 
will not be considered in this paper.  
There are four funds under the GEF which fund adaptation, the GEF trust 
fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), the Special Climate 
Change fund (SCCF) and the Adaptation Fund. The projects under the GEF 
‘are some of the first in the world tackling the actual impacts of climate 
change across development sectors, such as agriculture and food security.’67
 
 
Each of these funds is addressed in the following section.  
  
 
 
3.1.1 The Global Environment Facility Fund (GEF) 
 
                                               
64   Article 4.1b, 4.1e, 3.3, 4.3 and 4.4 UNFCCC. 
65  Decision 1 /COP-16 paragraph 102 available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=4. 
66  Decision 1 /COP-16 paragraph 107 available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=4. 
67  Report of the GEF to the sixteenth session of the conference of the Parties, 
p.22, 1 July 2010 available at 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/document/GEF_COP16_Report.
pdf. 
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The GEF was set up in 1991 in collaboration between the World Bank, 
United Nations development program and United Nations Environment 
program so as to provide funding to protect the global environment.68 The 
GEF was entrusted with the administration of adaptation funding scheme 
under the UNFCCC according to art 11 and 21. 3 69 Although the GEF was 
initially required to provide mitigation financing it was in 2001 made the 
supervisory body of the adaptation fund under the Kyoto Protocol as well as 
the LDCF and the SCCF.70 Today the GEF has six areas of focus, climate 
change being one. 71 Biodiversity and climate change make up the majority 
projects with the GEF as a whole. The GEF trust fund is entirely funded by 
developed country donations and is replenished every four years.72 To date 
the GEF trust fund has in total received 15.225 billion US dollars over five 
replenishments.73
 
   
To understand what adaptation means according to the GEF, the GEF 
funding policy must be investigated. The GEF provides funding ‘to meet the 
agreed incremental costs of measures to achieve agreed global 
environmental benefits’. 74
 
 The following sections investigate the concepts 
of ‘incremental costs’ and ‘global environmental benefit’ in the context of 
adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change.  
 
 
 
 
3.1.2 Incremental cost 
The GEF trust fund can only fund activities that exceed a certain baseline 
cost. Mace explains that ‘incremental cost refers to the cost differential 
between a baseline action to address a national need and the additional cost 
of an action that generates global environmental benefits.'75
                                               
68   Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.227, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf. 
 This in turn is a 
69  Ibid.  
70  Verheyen, Adaptation to anthropogenic climate change- The International 
Legal Framework, p.135, RECIEL 11 (2) 2002 available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-
9388.00312/abstract;jsessionid=B53DB1F619DAB6EA34B5EE67CC0D57F5.d03t02. 
71  Bouwer et al, Financing Climate Change Adaptation, p.53 (2006) 
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2006.00306.x/abstract.  
72  GEF Administered trust funds, GEF homepage available at  
http://www.thegef.org/gef/trust_funds. 
73  GEF Administered trust funds, GEF homepage available at  
http://www.thegef.org/gef/trust_funds April 2011. 
74   Who can apply? GEF homepage available at  
http://www.thegef.org/gef/who_can_apply  April 2011. 
 
75  Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.226, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf. 
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consequence of the UNFCCC only focusing on anthropogenic climate 
change, not climate variability as such. The baseline cost therefore refers to 
non-anthropogenic climate change adaptation measures. As a result, all 
adaptation measures funded by the GEF trust fund must be proven to only 
address anthropogenic climate change and not climate variability as such. 
However, as Verheyen points out ‘as of yet, there is no methodology’ to 
separate the costs arising from anthropogenic climate from those arising 
from climate variability.76 Moreover, although guidelines provided by the 
GEF trust fund for the assessment of incremental costs have been 
recognized to be inadequate for adaptation purposes, ‘the GEF still reiterates 
the concept of incremental costs.’77
 
 
Article 4.3 in the UNFCCC remains ambiguous as to that what financial 
needs are to be covered 
 
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in 
Annex II shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the 
agreed full costs …they shall also provide such financial resources, 
including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing country 
Parties. 
 
On one hand article 4.3 speaks of resources needed; (suggesting a real 
need), but on the other hand it will only fund costs that are ‘agreed’ upon by 
the GEF.78   The contradictory nature of art 4.3 suggests that that a balance 
needs to be struck between the actual need (resources needed) and the 
interest of the GEF donors, resulting in any funding obligation being 
impeded by donor discretion.79
 
     
 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
76  Verheyen, Adaptation to anthropogenic climate change- The International 
Legal Framework, p.137, RECIEL 11 (2) 2002 available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-
9388.00312/abstract;jsessionid=B53DB1F619DAB6EA34B5EE67CC0D57F5.d03t02. 
 
77   Verheyen, Adaptation to anthropogenic climate change- The 
International Legal Framework, p.135, RECIEL 11 (2) 2002 available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-
9388.00312/abstract;jsessionid=B53DB1F619DAB6EA34B5EE67CC0D57F5.d03t02. 
 
78   Verheyen, Adaptation to anthropogenic climate change- The 
International Legal Framework, p.136, RECIEL 11 (2) 2002 available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-
9388.00312/abstract;jsessionid=B53DB1F619DAB6EA34B5EE67CC0D57F5.d03t02. 
   
79  Ibid. 
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3.1.3 Global benefit 
In the Third Overall Performance Study of the GEF, global environmental 
benefit is defined by the GEF as  
 
‘minimizing climate change damage through: mitigation measures that 
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by means of the adoption of low- 
and zero-GHG-emitting technologies (for example, in the energy and 
transport sectors) or that protect or enhance the removal of atmospheric 
GHG by sinks, thus reducing the risk of climate change, and adaptation 
activities that minimize the adverse effects of climate change.’80
 
 
The concept of ‘global environmental benefit’ has been criticized for being 
another obstacle to funding adaptation projects. Mace argues that although 
global environmental benefits could be obtained whenever a global 
environmental objective is met, ‘a global environmental benefit is distinct 
from the achievement of development or local benefits.’81
 
 
In relation to adaptation, global environmental benefit means ‘minimizing 
the adverse effects of climate change.’ However, many measures aimed at 
addressing adaptation could also qualify as general development projects.82 
As a result Verheyen argues that these ‘would only fall within the scope of 
the climate regime if they specifically focused on adaptation’.83
 
 
Moreover, the criteria ‘global’ is also problematic as most adaptation 
projects are mostly of local or regional benefit.84
 
   
3.1.4 Donor influence 
Although the GEF is obliged to follow the decisions of the Conference of 
the Parties (COP), the institutional arrangement of the GEF differs 
significantly from the COP where each party theoretically has one vote.85
                                               
80  Third Overall performance study of the GEF, Final Report, (ICF 
consulting 30 June 2005) at 84 citing incremental costs, (GEF/C.7 Inf.5, 29 February 1996).    
 
81  Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.227, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf. 
82  Verheyen, Adaptation to anthropogenic climate change- The International 
Legal Framework, p.138, RECIEL 11 (2) 2002 available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-
9388.00312/abstract;jsessionid=B53DB1F619DAB6EA34B5EE67CC0D57F5.d03t02. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Verheyen, Adaptation to anthropogenic climate change- The International 
Legal Framework, p.135, RECIEL 11 (2) 2002 available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-
9388.00312/abstract;jsessionid=B53DB1F619DAB6EA34B5EE67CC0D57F5.d03t02. 
   
85  Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.229, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf. 
   
23 
 
The decision making body in the GEF is the GEF council. Usually, all 
decisions are taken by consensus, but in consideration of any matter of 
substance in which no consensus is reached through regular procedure any 
member may require a formal vote. Because decisions requiring formal 
votes are generally taken ‘by a double-weighted majority, which requires an 
affirmative vote representing both a 60 %  majority of the total number of 
participants and a 60% majority of the total contributions’ the major donors, 
such as the United States are the most influential.86
 
  
This is according to Verheyen, one of the key problems within the GEF 
structure. The usage of the concept incremental, for example, however 
criticized by the GEF itself, remains because the donor community wishes 
to keep it.87 Verheyen concludes that as result of this ‘the fund cannot and 
will not fund adaptation measures.’88
   
 
At present, countries contribute to the GEF trust fund at their own 
discretion. The conventions institutional arrangement does not only 
facilitate donor influence in decision making, the convention also does not 
provide any structure for burden sharing between the OECD countries and 
economies in transmission in the UNFCCC.89  Moreover, there are no 
objective criteria which establish the donor country’s obligations. Verheyen 
sees this as one the fundamental flaws within the present structure, and 
proposes that the principle of common but differentiated responsibility 
could provide some guidance in future negations ‘perhaps leading to a 
distribution of funding obligations on the basis of emission shares.’90
 
 Mace 
also argues, as outlined below, that the criteria for accessing LDCF and 
SCCF have been directly affected by donor influence. 
3.2 The Adaptation fund 
 
The Adaptation fund was created as a part of the so called Marrakesh 
Accords at the seventh COP in 2001.  Although the Adaptation fund is not 
                                               
86  Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.230, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf. 
   
87  Verheyen, Adaptation to anthropogenic climate change- The International 
Legal Framework, p.135, RECIEL 11 (2) 2002 available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-
9388.00312/abstract;jsessionid=B53DB1F619DAB6EA34B5EE67CC0D57F5.d03t02. 
 
88  Ibid. 
   
89  OECD countries and economies in transission are included in Annex 2 of 
the UNFCCC. 
90  Verheyen, Adaptation to anthropogenic climate change- The International 
Legal Framework, p.141, RECIEL 11 (2) 2002 available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-
9388.00312/abstract;jsessionid=B53DB1F619DAB6EA34B5EE67CC0D57F5.  
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financed by the GEF, it is managed by it. The Adaptation fund finances 
implementation of concrete adaptation projects in Non Annex One countries 
which includes activities to prevent desertification and land degradation. 
The Adaptation fund is funded through the clean development mechanism 
(CDM), one of the flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto protocol, as well 
as other sources.91
 
 The CDM is an arrangement which allows Annex One 
parties to create tradable certified emission reduction units by investing in 
projects for sustainable development. Art 12. 8 stipulates that  
a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover 
administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that 
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet 
the costs of adaptation. 
 
The Adaptation fund is therefore dependent on revenues from the CDM 
mechanism.   
 
However, the dependency of the Adaptation fund is not restricted to the 
success of CDM mechanism. In effect, the CDM mechanism and its 
potential success in generating revenue is dependent upon the extent to 
which Annex One parties choose to meet their commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol, as well as whether they choose to rely on the CDM for 
another commitment period.92 Furthermore, Annex Two parties, OECD 
countries and economies in transmission, that have not ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol or do not utilize the CDM mechanism will not be contributing to 
the Adaptation fund to begin with. Mace concludes that ‘thus, like the 
discretionary SCCF and LDC Fund, the Adaptation Fund does not reflect an 
equitable sharing of the burden of adaptation among developed countries.’93 
Furthermore, the term ‘particularly vulnerable’ is not defined in the Kyoto 
Protocol or the UNFCCC. Hence no clear recipient of adaptation funding is 
identifiable. Due to this lack of transparent obligations and criteria 
Verheyen suggests that ‘it is currently impossible’ to determine what has to 
be financed by Annex Two parties. 94
 
  
3.3 Least  Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF) 
 
                                               
91  Article 12 in the Kyoto Protocol. 
92  Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.240, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf. 
93  Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.241, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf. 
94  Verheyen, Climate change damage and International law, p. 137, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2005). 
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The LDCF was created as part of the Marrakesh accords. As of March 2011, 
120 million US dollars has been generated to the LDCF.95  Whereas the 
Adaptation fund under the Kyoto Protocol focuses only on incremental costs 
of adaptation, the LDCF´s focus is to help the least developed countries 
(LDC) prepare and implement national adaptation programs of action 
(NAPAs).  The NAPA process itself is a country driven and bottom up 
process aiming to result in a list of ‘urgent’ and ‘immediate’ adaptation 
projects.96 Multidisciplinary NAPA committees research key adaptation 
measures ‘whose further delay could increase vulnerability, or lead to increased 
costs at a later stage’ by looking at vulnerability for climate change variability 
and looking at whether climate change is increasing associated risks. 97
 
 
Countries are eligible to apply for funding up to USD 200.000.  
The criteria ‘incremental cost’ and ‘global benefit’ do not apply to the 
LDCF and SCCF. 98 The criteria ‘incremental cost’ and ‘global benefit’ are 
replaced by the concept of ‘additional cost.’ Instead of global benefit, 
funding is provided to development measures. Additional cost, just as 
incremental cost, is measured against a baseline of non climate change 
related development measures. The application of the additional cost 
principle has, according to a GEF report, been tested with ‘positive feedback 
from stakeholders.’99
 
   
The concept of additional cost is important to understand what adaptation 
measures are funded under the LDCF.  Additional cost is described as ‘costs 
imposed on vulnerable countries to meet their immediate adaptation 
needs.’100 Similar to incremental cost, activities implemented in the absence 
of climate change (anthropogenic) constitute the baseline. All development 
measures above this baseline are covered by the LDCF.101
                                               
95  GEF Administrated Trust Funds, GEF website available at 
  As a result, all 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/trust_funds.  
96   See Decisions 5 and 7 from COP-7 and guidelines for the Preparation of 
National Adaptation Programmes of Action.  See also Establishment of a Least Developed 
Countries Expert Group (Decision 28/CP.7, 2001) and Establishment of a Least Developed 
Countries Expert Group (Decision 29/CP.7, 2001), Annex. 
97   Ibid. 
98  Revised programming strategy on adaptation to climate change for the 
least developed countries fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change fund (SCCF), 
Prepared by the GEF secretariat, p.11, November 18th 2010 available at 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/SPA%20Approach%20Paper.pd
f. 
99  Revised programming strategy on adaptation to climate change for the 
least developed countries fund (LDCF) and Special Climate Change Fund, prepared by the 
GEF secretariat, 18th November 2010, p. 12 available at  
 http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Program%20str
ategy%20V.2.pdf. 
100  Programming paper for funding the implementation of NAPAS under the 
LDCF trust fund, p.4,  GEF decision 28 /18 May 12th 2006, available at  
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF.C.28.18.pdf. 
101  Programming paper for funding the implementation of NAPAS under the 
LDCF trust fund, p.8, GEF decision 28 /18 May 12th 2006, available at  
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF.C.28.18.pdf.   
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adaptation costs are measured against a fictional baseline separating 
anthropogenic climate change from natural climate variability. 
  
In the history of the LDCF a rupture between the least developed countries 
and the GEF has manifested itself on several issues, indicating opposing 
views on how and to what extent adverse effects of climate change should 
be funded under the UNFCCC. On one occasion a conflict of interest 
between the GEF and the LDC countries arose in the negotiations following 
decision 6/COP- 9. Decision 6/COP-9 called upon the LDCF to support the 
implementation of NAPAS, prompting the GEF secretariat to produce a 
proposal entitled ‘Elements to be taken into Account in Implementing 
NAPAs under the LDC Fund.’  The proposal contained a ‘sliding 
proportional scale’ for LDC funding. Projects within the sliding scale did 
not need to further demonstrate its need for additional funding for 
adaptation. The proposal was not welcomed by the LDC countries. LDC 
countries argued that it should be up to the COP, and not the GEF to decide 
on the criteria for funding. 102
 
   
Furthermore, the question of the accessibility and allocation of funding 
under the LDCF has also become a major source of disagreement for the 
UNFCCC parties.  The GEF secretariats decisive role in the LDC funding 
process has also been heavily criticized by LDC countries. At COP-9 in 
2003, when no full decision was reached as to the allocation of the LDC 
funds and activities parties requested instead that the GEF develop 
operational guidelines based on a number of other elements. 103
 
   
The relevance of disagreement in the LDCF as to allocation of resources 
and the role of the GEF indicate that the concept and practice of adaptation 
is not simply a matter of implementing the UNFCCC. Implementing the 
UNFCCC must consider that the scope and exact meaning of adaptation 
under the UNFCCC and GEF differ between states. As a result, it is clear 
that the definition of adaptation under the UNFCCC is not uniform. The 
concept of adaptation and its legal implications are still not established in 
international law. 
 
                                               
102  ‘UNFCCC COP-10 Highlights: Monday, 6 December 2004’, 12:250 Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin (2004), 1, available at www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12250e.pdf.  
103  Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Ninth Session, see, 
specifically, Further Guidance for the Operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund 
(Decision 6/CP.9, 2003). Website and document 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop9/06a01.pdf. 
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3.4 The Special Climate change fund 
(SCCF) 
The SCCF was established in accordance with decision 7/COP-2 with the 
purpose of complementing the GEF trust fund in a number of areas.104 
Adaptation efforts specifically focus on supporting developing countries in 
preparing national communications to the UNFCCC and adaptation 
activities related to national communications. Support is also provided for 
various activities such as information networks, prioritized projects 
identified in the National communication and early warning systems for 
extreme weather events.105
 
 
The SCCF relies on  ‘Parties included in Annex II of the Convention, and 
other Parties included in Annex I that are in a position to do so… to make 
contributions to the Special Climate Change Fund.’106
 
   
Perhaps due to the fact that the SCCF relies on voluntary contributions, 
donor influence has come to play a crucial role in the funding of adaptation 
projects under the SCCF. Mace argues that the SCCF is one of the clearest 
examples of how the GEF has found ways of addressing donor discomfort 
by keeping open ended paragraph, resulting in vague obligations.107 In 
2004, the GEF produced a document ‘Programming to Implement the 
Guidance for the Special Climate Change Fund’, which addressed how the 
resources of the SCCF could be programmed during an initial 5-year period 
to respond to guidance provided at COP 9. The document however failed to 
address all paragraphs in the COP 7 decision, instead providing that 
additional guidance and programs would be developed. Moreover, the 
program made clear that ‘separate trust fund agreements would be 
concluded with each individual donor, governing the uses of the donors 
contributions to the fund.’108
                                               
104  These areas are adaptation, energy, forestry, industry, technology transfers, 
transport, waste management and activities to assist developing country parties in 
diversifying their economies. 
 As a result Mace argues ‘the creation of 
distinct programs and use of separate administration agreements, allowed 
105  Bouwer et al, Financing Climate Change Adaptation, p.52 (2006) 
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2006.00306.x/abstract.   
106  Programming to implement the guidance for the Special Climate Change 
Fund adopted by the conference of the parties to the united nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change at its ninth session, p. 6 paragraph 20, GEF decision 24/12,15 October, 
2004 available at http://www.ifad.org/operations/gef/climate/11.pdf.  
 
107   Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.237, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf. 
 .  
108  Programming to Implement the Guidance for the Special Climate Change 
Fund Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change at its Ninth Session (GEF/C.24/12, 15 October 2004), 
paragraph 5, 36 and 37. 
  Available at http://www.ifad.org/operations/gef/climate/11.pdf. 
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donors to fund only the elements of Decision 7/CP.7 that they care to fund – 
although Decision 7/CP.7, agreed by the COP, provides that the SCCF is to 
finance activities in all areas.’109
 
 
3.5  Discussion 
 
The GEF funding mechanism under the UNFCCC is based on the 
commitments in article 4.3 and 4.4 which acknowledge common but 
differentiated responsibilities with regard to the adverse effects of climate 
change. Despite establishing that resources needed are to be financed by the 
developed country parties to assist developing countries in adaptation, such 
an obligation is not reflected in the current adaptation fund scheme under 
the GEF. 110 Philippe Sands argues that provision 4.4 is ‘as close as we can 
get to implicit agreements that there is historical responsibility.’111
 
 
However, even if one agrees with Sands controversial analysis, in practice 
this acknowledgment falls flat. Contribution to the GEF funding scheme for 
adaptation is voluntary and does not reflect any historic or present 
responsibility for climate change.    
The GEF funding scheme, as stated in the introduction, is entirely dependent 
on voluntary contributions. The GEF funding scheme does not clearly 
identify the recipients of funding (particularly vulnerable is not defined in 
the UNFCCC), nor any criteria to oblige parties to the convention to provide 
funding. 
 
The conditionality of adaptation funding under the GEF funding mechanism 
is manifested in numerous guidelines and provisions. For example, 
contributions to the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol are only 
possible if revenue is generated from CDM projects, which means that a 
party could only contribute to the adaptation fund if it is party to the Kyoto 
Protocol and voluntarily chooses to use the CDM mechanism.112
 
 One of the 
world’s largest emitters, the Unites States, is still not party to the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
The dependence of the Adaptation Fund on the Kyoto Protocol and the 
CDM mechanisms illustrates that contributing to the Adaptation fund is 
really completely at states discretion. Addressing how to apportion funding 
                                               
109  Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.237, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf.     
110  Article 4.3 UNFCCC as discussed stipulates resources needed are to be 
financed. 
111   Sands, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, p.275, 
RECIEL 1 (3) 1992. 
112  Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.241, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf.     
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responsibility among the world’s largest emitters is crucial. Verheyen 
suggests this is one of the most pressing concerns of the convention 
remarking that the convention does not ‘stipulate any formula for burden 
sharing between Annex Two countries.’113
  
 Furthermore, the future of the 
Adaptation Fund depends on the political will to continue its operation in a 
post 2012 agreement.  
The institutional set up of the GEF trust fund, endows donors with major 
influence in the decision making process of the GEF.114 The leverage donors 
have in the GEF could be said to further disadvantage the position for 
countries that are to be worst hit by the adverse effects of climate change.115 
Because the GEF  trust fund is directly dependent on donations from 
developed countries, the GEF has developed a structure in which the donor 
country has a direct influence on what country and project receives GEF 
funding.116
 
 This is shown in the SCCF funding policy as well as the LDCF 
funding structure.  
As the analysis in this chapter has shown, the criteria of ‘incremental cost’ 
and ‘global environmental benefit’ have arguably proven inadequate in the 
context of adaptation.117
 
 
According to article 2 of the UNFCCC the objective of the convention is to 
prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ 
The adverse effects of climate change cannot be isolated from changes 
occurring due to natural climate variability. Today there exists no 
measurement to differentiate local causes of impacts (regional climate 
variability, socio-economic changes, land-use changes) from global causes 
(climate change caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions).118
                                               
113  Verheyen, Adaptation to anthropogenic climate change- The International 
Legal Framework, p.141, RECIEL 11 (2) 2002 available at 
    
Only focusing adaptation on anthropogenic climate change assumes that the 
adverse effects of climate change can be divided into human and non human 
induced. From the perspective of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions the 
focus of the UNFCCC on anthropogenic change is feasible. For purposes of 
adaptation however, this becomes a problem. It is against this backdrop that 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-
9388.00312/abstract;jsessionid=B53DB1F619DAB6EA34B5EE67CC0D57F5. 
114  Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.241, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf.     
115  Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.240, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf.     
116  Ibid.     
117  Verheyen, Adaptation to anthropogenic climate change- The International 
Legal Framework, p.135, RECIEL 11 (2) 2002 available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-
9388.00312/abstract;jsessionid=B53DB1F619DAB6EA34B5EE67CC0D57F5.    
118   Bouwer et al, Financing Climate Change Adaptation, p.58 (2006) 
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2006.00306.x/abstract.   
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the GEF criteria of incremental and additional cost create a fictional 
baseline. The fictional creation of a scientific tool to separate human 
induced climate change from non human induced climate change is an 
institutional problem within the UNFCCC. Since the GEF is mandated 
through the UNFCCC, the ultimate supervisory body of the GEF funding 
mechanism is the COP. In light of the difficulties of separating 
anthropogenic climate change from non anthropogenic climate change, the 
GEF has been given a new mandate to provide funding without establishing 
a baseline of non anthropogenic adaptation needs. 119
 
  
This new mandate could be seen as the beginning of a new climate change 
scheme.120
 
 In this new scheme anthropogenic climate change would not 
determine what adaptation costs are funded. However, as of today this 
practice remains an exception in the GEF funding policy.  
Mace and Verheyen argue that it is pressing in a post 2012 commitment to 
institutionalize funding so that the parties most responsible for climate 
change contribute.121 Not only will this maintain trust and commitment from 
developing country parties but also instill a preventive attitude in which 
future major emitters, such as China, will have incentive to implement 
mitigation efforts. 122
 
   
  
                                               
119  Verheyen, Climate change damage and International law, p. 362, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2005). 
 
120  Ibid. 
 
121   Mace, Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF 
developments since COP-7, p.246, RECIEL 14 (3) 2005 available at 
www.field.org.uk/files/Adapt_funding_RECIEL_MJMace.pdf.     
   
122  International energy agency IEA statistics, CO2 emissions from fuel 
combustion highlights, 2010 edition, p.7, available at 
http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/co2highlights.pdf.  
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4 Reparation according to the 
International law commission 
4.1 Introduction 
This section considers the concept of reparation according to the ILC draft 
articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. The 
objective, function and different forms of reparation are analyzed by 
considering cases and awards. Restitution and compensation, two forms of 
reparation, are investigated in relation to environmental damage and climate 
change damage. 
 
The issue of state responsibility has been the subject of much debate and has 
been specifically addressed by the ILC. The ILC was established under 
article 13.2 in the UN charter to facilitate ‘the promotion of the progressive 
development of international law and its codification.’123 The ILC 
codification of international customary law is a rigorous procedure 
involving consultation with governments and scientific institutions before 
and after the completion of the draft articles.124
 
  The draft articles on 
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts which are analyzed 
in this paper, are the result of a codification process starting in 1949 and 
culminating with the adoption by the ILC in 2001.     
The draft articles on State responsibility are a result of the commission’s 
work; they are not by virtue of the commission’s work part of customary 
law. Nevertheless, they ‘constitute a reasonable prima facie indication of the 
world view on a particular legal question.’125 In other words, it is argued 
that ‘the Commissions influence is a material source of international law’ 
and in that sense ‘it has a role as part of a process which is in the realm of 
law making.’126 Furthermore, Watts describes the work of the Commission 
as ‘not just convenient but authoritative.’ 127
 
 
My analysis in this chapter presupposes that the ILC work is an 
authoritative view on state responsibility. Due to space constrains my 
investigation only considers the ILC draft articles. 128
                                               
123  Article 1, statute of International Law Commission available at, 
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf. 
   
124  Article 16, statute of International Law commission, available at  
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf. 
125  Watts, The international law commission 1949 to 1998, p.15, KCMG, QC 
Oxford University Press, (2000).    
126  Ibid.  
127 Ibid.   
128  Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) , article 38 (1) mentions 
three sources of international law a. international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international 
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If state responsibility can be established for an internationally wrongful act, 
the first obligation to arise is to discontinue the wrongful act, secondly to 
offer guarantees of non repetition, and thirdly to make full reparation.129
 
 To 
investigate whether causing climate change damage could in fact constitute 
an internationally wrongful act is beyond the scope of this paper.  
The duty to ‘remove’ the damage caused is called reparation. Article 34 in 
the ILC draft identifies three forms of reparation ‘full reparation… shall 
take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or 
in combination.’ This chapter provides an analysis of these notions.   
  
 
4.2 Restitution 
Restitution is defined in article 35 of the ILC draft articles as the obligation, 
‘to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was 
committed, provided and to the extent that restitution.’ Restitution is 
however only provided if it is ‘not materially impossible’ and ‘it does not 
involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution 
instead of compensation.’130
Restitution is the primary means of reparation.
 The obligation to provide restitution is 
therefore not unconditional.  
131
 
 The obligation to 
restitution was first articulated in the Chorzow factory case in which the 
court held that 
‘Reparation, must as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences, wipe out 
all the consequences of the illegal act and which would, in all probability 
not have existed if the act had not been committed.’ 132
 
   
Restitution was central in Trail Smelter arbitration and is of particular 
interest for climate change damage. The award in the arbitration illustrates 
what restitution might entail in the context of a continuous harmful activity. 
In the Trail smelter arbitration a Canadian smelter, near the U.S. border, 
emitted sulfur dioxide fumes. The fumes caused damage on U.S. territory 
and the question ended up before an arbitration tribunal. The tribunal held 
that Canada was responsible for the activities of the smelter under 
international law and that it had an obligation to compensate the U.S. for the 
damages. The tribunal also held that Canada should cease all activities that 
damaged U.S. territory and enforce a stricter operational regime for the 
                                                                                                                       
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations.   
129  Article 30, ILC draft articles on State Responsibility 2001. 
130  Article 35, ILC draft articles on State Responsibility 2001. 
131   Article 36, ILC draft articles on State Responsibility 2001. 
132  Permanent Court of International (PCIJ) Series A no. 17, p 47.  
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smelter.133
 
 The setting up of a stricter operational regime for the smelter 
illustrates the point of awarding compensation for the damage already 
caused and at the same time address the future damage that would inevitably 
occur from the ongoing harmful activity. As is discussed in the analysis, 
potential compensation for climate change damage could be combined with 
commitments to curb future carbon emissions.  
The tribunal in the Trail Smelter arbitration also called upon what has later 
been known as the no harm principle 
  
‘under the principles of international law, as well as of the law of the United 
States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and 
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.’134
 
   
In this sense, the Trail Smelter award comes close to restitution ‘insofar as it 
compels the more diligent regulation of the smelter.’135
 
 
The obligation to repair an internationally wrongful act by the way of 
restitution is therefore ‘well established’ and is, just as the no harm 
principle, not controversial. 136
 
 Nevertheless, as is discussed in the following 
section, it is limited  
For restitution to arise as a reparative obligation, it must be materially 
possible and not entail a disproportionate burden to provide restitution 
instead of compensation.137 This in effect means that not all damages could 
be repaired through restitution. In the context of climate change damage this 
has been increasingly apparent. In this regard, the ILC definition of 
restitution  is given ‘its narrowest possible meaning… it neither includes 
establishment of the situation that would have existed but for the wrong, nor 
does it require a transfer of any profit accruing to the wrongdoer because of 
the wrong.’138
 
 
                                               
133  Okidi, Trail Smelter case, p.1  Judicial decisions on matters related to the 
environment , International decisions volume 1(1998) available at  
http://www.unep.org/padelia/publications/Jud.dec.%20pre(Int%20.pdf.  
134   Reports of International arbitral awards, Trail Smelter case, p.1996, 
Volume 3 p.1905-1982,UN 2006 available at  
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf. 
   
135  Birnie & Boyle & Redgwell, International law and the environment, p.192, 
3rd edition, Oxford University Press (2009).  
136  Sands, Principles of International environmental Law, p.837, 2nd edition 
Cambridge University Press (2003).    
137  article 35 ILC draft articles. 
138  Birnie & Boyle & Redgwell, International law and the environment, p.192, 
3rd edition, Oxford University Press (2009).  
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According to Birnie and Boyle the requirement ‘not materially impossible’ 
implies two pre conditions.139 Firstly, restitution requires that the situation 
before the damage occurred can be reestablished. Secondly ‘it is necessary 
to identify the baseline conditions that existed prior to when the damage 
occurred.’140
 
 
Moreover, Birnie and Boyle argue that the extent of restitution is heavily 
dependent the state’s primary environmental obligations. Therefore, in the 
context of international state responsibility differing legislation on 
environmental protection might come into play. One such example is the 
protection of wildlife habitat. Provisions and regulations that protect 
wildlife habitat often result in restitution including reestablishment and 
protection of those same areas. 141 Birnie and Boyle therefore conclude that 
‘restitution of damage will not be either adequate or appropriate in each 
case.’142
 
 
 
 
4.3 Compensation  
The obligation to pay compensation is defined in article 36 ILC draft 
articles as 
 
The state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an 
obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such 
damage is not made good by restitution. The compensation shall cover any 
financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is 
established. 
 
Compensation is a secondary form of reparation. For compensation to arise 
as a form or reparation, the damage must be financially assessable.143 This 
provision has been criticized for being inadequate not only in the context of 
climate change damage but also for environmental damages in general.144 
The main question that arises is ’whether environmental harm not 
quantifiable in terms of damage to property or economic loss is recoverable 
by way of monetary compensation.’145
                                               
139  Birnie & Boyle & Redgwell, International law and the environment, p.192, 
3rd edition, Oxford University Press (2009).   
 What methods of evaluating 
environmental damage would be acceptable?  What damage to a states 
territory is assessable in monetary terms and are there any limitations? 
140 Ibid.  
141  Ibid.  
142  Ibid. 
143   Article 36, commentary no.4,  ILC draft articles on State responsibility 
2001 with commentaries.   
144  Birnie & Boyle & Redgwell, International law and the environment, p.192, 
3rd edition, Oxford University Press (2009).    
145  Ibid.  
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Birine and Boyle ask the question ‘would the attribution of notional or non 
market based valuations of depleted natural resources be covered under this 
formulation?’ 146In the case of oil blow spill damages, the International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Fund has rejected non market based methods, 
whereas US, Italian and Russian law have employed the same.147 Birnie and 
Boyle argue ‘whatever test is used, compensation is not unlimited, but 
bounded by the notion of remoteness and proximity.’148 In effect this will 
mean that ‘regardless of whether international law in principle compensates 
for environmental damage, however defined, in some cases compensation 
will be denied on grounds of proximity and remoteness.’149
 
 In the case of 
global climate change damage addressing this issue is crucial. 
In the context of environmental damage, the form of reparation of particular 
relevance is compensation. Often, environmental damage causes irreversible 
harm which makes restitution materially impossible. This problem was 
recognized and addressed in the Gabcikovo Nagymaros case.150 In the 
Gabcikovo Nagymaros case the court held that ‘vigilance and prevention are 
required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the 
environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of 
reparation of this type of damage.’151
 
 As discussed in the analysis, this 
assertion indicates the necessity of a preventive approach towards 
irreversible damage. 
When establishing a duty to pay compensation a legal investigation must 
assert that a state in fact has breached an obligation through an act that 
attributes responsibility to that state. A due diligence standard must be 
established. Furthermore, damage can only be compensated if it is proven to 
have a causal link to the wrongful act in question. Causation must be 
proven. As is discussed below, these considerations illustrate the constrains 
of compensation as reparation for climate change damage.  
 
Strict liability, liability arising irrespective of culpability, for an 
internationally wrongful act is not found the ILC draft articles on state 
responsibility. During the codification process of the draft articles for state 
responsibility, it was observed that ‘state practice did not support the 
codification of strict responsibility.’152
                                               
146  Birnie & Boyle & Redgwell, International law and the environment, p.194, 
3rd edition, Oxford University Press (2009).   
   
147  Ibid.   
148  Birnie & Boyle & Redgwell, International law and the environment, p.193, 
3rd edition, Oxford University Press (2009).  
149  Ibid.  
150  International Court of Justice, Case concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros 
Project, p.146 (1997) available through http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf.  
151   Ibid. 
152  Verheyen, Climate change damage and International law, p. 157, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2005).  
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4.3.1 Due diligence and forseeability of harm 
 
Defining due diligence,   is ‘a prerequisite where a state invokes the no harm 
rule... to prevent harm, or indeed, compensation once damage has 
occurred.’153
 
 
As discussed in the section on the no harm principle, the vagueness of the 
no harm principle leaves open to interpretation whether harm itself or only 
harm for certain activities is prohibited under customary law.  In light of 
this, the ILC draft articles on the prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities attempted to address hazardous activities not regulated 
by international law. In the case of climate change damage, the activities 
giving rise to the damage, such as greenhouse gas emissions, often are not 
prohibited under international law. In this regard, the draft articles on 
Prevention of Trans boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities can provide 
guidance.  In the draft articles on Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
activities due diligence is defined as  
 
due diligence  …is not intended to guarantee that significant harm be totally 
prevented, if it is not possible to do so. .. the State of origin is required, as 
noted above, to exert its best possible efforts to minimize the risk. In this 
sense, it does not guarantee that the harm would not occur.154
 
 
However, only knowing about the consequences of greenhouse gas 
emissions is not sufficient to establish state responsibility. Verheyen argues 
that it is only by looking at ‘a states means and capacity to act within an 
international context’ that state responsibility can be established.155
 
  
Similarly Dellink et al argue that ‘a more convincing argument is that 
countries could have acted from the moment they started to negotiate on 
how to address the problem.’156
 
 Since negotiations on climate change 
started around 1990, would that in effect mean that countries would only be 
liable to compensate for damage caused by emissions after 1990? Such 
suggestions are controversial in light of historic responsibility for green 
house gas emissions. 
Furthermore, Voigt argues that acting with due diligence with respect to 
climate change damages ‘involves taking appropriate preventive measures, 
                                               
153  Verheyen, Climate change damage and International law, p. 174, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2005).   
154  Article 3, Commentary no 7, draft articles on the prevention of 
transboundary harm from hazardous activities with commentaries 2001.   
155 Verheyen, Climate change damage and International law, p. 174, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (2005). 
156  Dellink et al, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities for adaptation 
financing: an assessment of the contributions of countries, The Institute for environmental 
studies (IVM) working paper, p.11 (2009). 
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even if full scientific certainty does not exist. Such a view is in line with the 
precautionary principle.’157
 
  
If a due diligence standard can be established, what measures are to be taken 
according to it? Deciding what these measures are must be determined by 
looking at national circumstances and capacity. This requires a balancing of 
legitimate interests, such as the injured state’s interests versus the economic 
and technical capabilities of the defendant state. 158
 
   
Another key criterion in establishing state responsibility is foreseeability of 
harm.159  Foreseeability of harm does not mean that the state could foresee 
the ‘precise magnitude or location of the injury’ - instead it suffices that the 
State, given its capacity ‘ought to have known the consequences.’160 
Determining if a state has fulfilled its due diligence obligation is therefore 
dependent upon whether it could foresee the harm. Voigt argues that 
because of the work of the IPCC, there is ‘little scope for states to argue that 
the likely impacts of increased GHG concentrations were not 
foreseeable.’161
 
 
4.3.2 Causation and causal uncertainty  
Closely linked to the problem of foreseeability is the issue of causation. A 
casual link between an activity and harm occurred is necessary to establish 
successful tort claim.  The form of causation relevant in the case of climate 
change damage is specific causation. Specific causation, as opposed to 
general causation, entails that a specific activity gives rise to a specific type 
of damage.162
 
   The problem of establishing specific causation between 
activity and harm was illustrated in the Inuit circumpolar petition.  
The Inuit petition was the first attempt to assert one state responsible for a 
global phenomenon resulting in global damage.163
                                               
157  Voigt, State responsibility for climate change damages, p.11, Nordic 
Journal of international law 77 (2008) 1-22P.  
 The Inuit circumpolar 
conference filed a petition with the Inter American Court of Human rights 
claiming that climate change, as a result of human activities, was resulting 
in infringements on the human rights of the Inuit in Canada, Denmark and 
the US. The U.S. as the world’s largest emitter, the petition held, has 
‘explicitly rejected international overtures’ despite   ‘knowledge that this 
158  Voigt, State responsibility for climate change damages, p. 12, Nordic 
Journal of international law 77 (2008) 1-22. 
159  Voigt, State responsibility for climate change damages, p. 11, Nordic 
Journal of international law 77 (2008) 1-22. 
160  Voigt, State responsibility for climate change damages, p. 12, Nordic 
Journal of international law 77 (2008) 1-22. 
161  Ibid. 
162  Voigt, State responsibility for climate change damages, p. 15, Nordic 
Journal of international law 77 (2008) 1-22.  
163  Koivurova, International Legal Avenues to Address the Plight of Victims 
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course of action is radically transforming the arctic environment upon which 
the Inuit depend.’164 This, according to the petition, gave rise to the US 
having a responsibility to take ‘immediate and effective action to protect the 
rights of the Inuit.’165 In an analysis of the Inuit petition, Koivurova finds 
that even though science is clear about climate change being human 
induced, and that the adverse consequences of climate change will in fact 
infringe upon the human rights of the Inuit ‘holding the United States solely 
accountable for what is clearly a global environmental problem is a 
tremendous leap to make despite the United States' role in generating 
greenhouse gases.’166
 
 
An analogous causation problem subsists in connection with incremental 
cost under the GEF funding mechanism. Determining what is human 
induced climate change and what is not human induced becomes central to 
establish causation, just as measuring a baseline of non anthropogenic 
climate change is under the present adaptation funding scheme. Today ‘it is 
impossible to know whether any given storm is due to anthropogenic 
warming or some other contributing factor.’167 Furthermore, on what basis 
would only one country be held liable for climate change damages? The fact 
that not only the defendant’s actions have contributed to climate change, 
including other pollutants and the plaintiffs own emissions means that the 
defendant state cannot be held solely responsible. Therefore, it is clear that 
establishing a causative link between global warming and regional climate 
change poses a ‘significant obstacle.’168
 
   
Related to the discussion about specific causation is the problem of causal 
uncertainty.  With what certainty could a states activity be found to cause 
certain damage? Nollkaemper argues that ‘the liability rule’ must be 
included using statistical and scientific evidence to examine the probability 
that a certain activity caused specific damage.169
                                               
164  Petition to the Inter American commission on human rights seeking relief 
from violations resulting from global warming caused by acts and omissions of the United 
States, p.6, Summary of the Petition, (7 December 2005)available at 
 This is referred to as 
‘probability of causation’ and is found using a mathematic formula which is 
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found by dividing the excess risk by the background risk and the excess 
risk.170
  
 
Related to the idea of solving casual uncertainty using probability of 
causation is the theory of ‘proportional liability.’ Proportional liability is 
found ‘by awarding the victim a proportionate amount of its damage based 
upon the probability of causation.’ 171  Proportional liability would therefore 
require the defendant state to compensate the plaintiff state according to the 
likelihood of that defendant state having caused the plaintiff states damage. 
This would in practice mean that, if, according to the above formula, the 
probability of causation is found to be 20 percent, the claimant would be 
compensated 20 percent of suffered damage from that defendant state. 172
 
 
Joint liability and multiple actors is another question that needs to be 
addressed when assessing liability for climate change damages. When 
anthropogenic climate change is caused by some actors who have emitted 
greatly in the past and others who recently become large emitters, how 
should responsibility be assessed? Although present day emissions are well 
documented, past emissions are not. Should a rule of joint or several 
liabilities be applied to accommodate for this difference? This issue is 
complex, and outside the scope of this paper. However, according to 
Nollkaemper ‘precisely because of the proportional character of the liability, 
monetary compensation seems the most appropriate remedy.’173
  
  
As to what form of reparation is most appropriate in the case of climate 
change damage, Nollkaemper argues that both an obligation to pay 
monetary compensation for residual damage of climate change damage and 
an obligation to mitigate climate change would be appropriate. Noellkamper 
argues  that ‘it may make little sense for the victim states to sue for a 
proportion of monetary damages representing the value of the damage 
caused by climate change if green house gas emissions were to continue 
unabated.’174
  
 
 
4.4 Satisfaction 
Satisfaction is the third form of reparation, only relevant when restitution 
and compensation do not suffice. Birnie and Boyle describe that in the case 
of environmental damage, satisfaction is left as ‘the only means of affording 
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some nominal redress.’175
 
  Satisfaction in the form of reparation does not 
include any material compensation. Satisfaction is defined in the ILC draft 
articles on state responsibility as  
an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as 
it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation. Satisfaction may 
consist in an acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a 
formal apology or another appropriate modality.176
 
  
In the context of climate change damage, satisfaction alone as a remedy 
seems distant. Although it is debatable whether all damage, such as 
ecological loss and traditional indigenous cultures are ‘financially 
assessable’, some damage, could be valued financially. 177
 
 Satisfaction could 
perhaps under such circumstances be combined with compensation. 
4.5 Discussion 
Out of the three forms of reparation, compensation and restitution are more 
relevant in case of climate change damage. Satisfaction can be provided in 
the event reparation cannot be made either through restitution or 
compensation. Establishing state responsibility for an internationally 
wrongful act does not result in an unconditional right to restitution or 
compensation.  
 
Restitution is the primary means of reparation. For restitution to be provided 
it must be ‘materially possible’, in the sense that the situation that prevailed 
before the wrongful act was committed could materially be re-established. 
Furthermore, restitution should not involve too much of a burden to provide 
instead of compensation. Baseline conditions that existed prior to the 
damage must also be identified.178
 
 Moreover, the extent of restitution today 
is dependent on the states primary obligations resulting in the extent of 
restitution differing between States.  The criterion ‘materially possible’ has 
proven difficult in the context of environmental damages. Environmental 
damages often lead to irreversible harm; harm that cannot be repaired 
through restitution.   
The secondary form of reparation is compensation. Similar to restitution, the 
obligation to provide compensation is dependent on a number of factors. For 
example, the damage occurred should not be too remote from the source, 
and it must be financially assessable. In the context of climate change 
damage this raises a number of questions. Is all climate change damage 
financially assessable, and if so, what method of valuing the damage should 
be applied? Furthermore, a successful claim for reparation for an 
                                               
175  Birnie & Boyle & Redgwell, International law and the environment, p.192, 
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internationally wrongful act must establish a causal link between damage 
and the activity allegedly giving rise to the injury.179
 
 A due diligence 
standard must also be established.  However, the absence of strict liability 
for internationally wrongful acts in international customary law does not 
preclude strict liability for emission of certain quantities of greenhouse 
gases in national legislation. With developing country parties reluctant to 
undertake binding commitments to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, a 
protocol signed by the UNFCCC parties stipulating strict liability for 
greenhouse gas emissions appears distant. Perhaps it is more realistic to 
believe national legislation will prove the force necessary to push 
international law in a more progressive direction than trusting that a 
progressive agreement will be concluded in a near future.  
Causality, casual certainty and foreseeability of harm make compensation 
dependent not only on what damage has occurred, but also on what 
proportionate measures the defendant state has taken and should have taken 
given its national circumstances.  
 
According to ILC, the three forms of reparation shall either take place 
‘singly or in combination.’180
 
 However, Noellkamper suggests that even a 
combination of the different forms of reparation might not suffice. Instead 
he proposes that liability for climate change damage should not only claim 
compensation for residual damage, but also a responsibility to mitigate 
climate change. Some climate change damage includes flooding of land 
because of rising sea levels. Would such ‘damages’ be most ‘effectively’ 
repaired by the relocation of affected populations, or by receiving monetary 
compensation for loss of subsistence and land?  
As is discussed in the analysis these kinds of considerations raise the 
question if adaptation as defined in the UNFCCC framework could be 
considered a form of reparation.  
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5 Analysis 
 
In order to consider what factors reconcile adaptation as an extension of 
reparation, and what factors resist such a conclusion the preceding 
investigations must be broken down and analyzed collectively.  
 
In light of the investigation on adaptation in the UNFCCC, adaptation can 
be conceptualized through its definition and form in the UNFCCC text, the 
adaptation funding policy under the GEF and general environmental law 
principles. In the following analysis, the relevance of the polluter pays 
principle, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, and the 
precautionary principle are addressed in relation to adaptation under 
UNFCCC.  The institute of reparation in the ILC framework is 
deconstructed into compensation and restitution and analyzed with reference 
to the definition of adaptation in the preceding section. The funding policy 
of the GEF is addressed with reference to reparation under the ILC 
framework.  
 
In this analytical framework, adaptation in the UNFCCC and reparation 
according to ILC appear to have certain features in common. The objective 
and purpose of adaptation in the UNFCCC and reparation in the ILC 
framework have similar shape. The precautionary principle is of particular 
interest in understanding the objective of adaptation.  
 
The precautionary principle, as explicitly stated in the UNFCCC, focuses on 
promoting preventive measures in case of scientific uncertainty. In relation 
to adaptation, its significance is less clear.  However, argues Brunnee ‘there 
is ample evidence of their (principles) ability to exert influence even while 
their legal status remains contested.’181 The precautionary principle at the 
international level ‘has found expression in an array of environmental 
instruments’ including dispute settlement, and thus the principle has ‘come 
to influence the evolution, interpretation, and implementation of  these 
agreements.’182
 
   
The feasibility of the application of the polluter pays principle for adaptation 
funding purposes is similarly uncertain. The polluter pays principle is not 
recognised as measure of responsibility between states under international 
customary law, although Dellink et al suggest that adaptation funding could 
be one extension of the polluter pays principle.183
                                               
181   Brunnee, The Stockholm declaration and the structure processes of 
International Environmental law, p.18, (2009) available at 
 Furthermore, the 
implementation of the polluter pays principle includes consideration of 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1437707. 
182  Ibid. 
183  See above section two Dellink et al, Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities for adaptation financing: an assessment of the contributions of countries, 
The Institute for environmental studies (IVM) working paper, p.6 (2009). 
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negligence and foreseeability of harm.  The definition and extent of 
negligence and forseeability of harm may differ according to state 
legislation. Therefore, the actual implementation of the polluter pays 
principle may differ between states. 184
 
   
Solidarity, described as the third element of the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility, does not give immediate rise to any binding 
legal obligations. However, similar to the concept of common concern, it 
provides a basis from which to argue that there should be a legal obligation 
to fund adaptation.  The concept of common concern ‘perhaps requires all 
states to participate in international efforts’ to address concerns identified as 
common concern.185 In practice, the concept common concern provides a 
starting point from which to argue that international cooperation is required 
to ‘counter degradation of areas beyond national jurisdiction.’186 The 
concept of common concern, similar to the precautionary principle, however 
lacks normative character and functions foremost as a ‘participation rule.’187 
Moreover, no criteria in the concept of common concern outline what 
concerns are to be identified as ‘common.’188
 
  
What significance is then to be attributed to the mentioned principles in 
relation to adaptation funding for climate change damage? The principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility, the concept of common concern, 
the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle cannot be 
considered part of customary law.189
 
 The no harm principle and principle 21 
only provide vague guidance in the assessment of climate change damage.  
Although the criteria to establish customary law are far from satisfied in the 
case of the polluter pays principle, the precautionary principle and the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility, perhaps they indicate 
a likely development of environmental law. The inclusion of the mentioned 
principles in the 1972 Stockholm declaration reinforces the idea that they do 
indeed constitute a first step according to Brunnee. She argues that ‘the  
(Stockholm) declaration should be appreciated as the beginning of a 
normative process’ instead of being assessed according to how many of its 
principles have become part of customary law.190
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Whereas adaptation under the UNFCCC framework refers exclusively to 
climate change damage, the institute of reparation has wide application to 
cover many types of damages. Reparation, according to the Chorzow 
factory case must ‘as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences, wipe 
out all the consequences of the illegal act and which would, in all 
probability not have existed if the act had not been committed.’ 191
 
 
 Restitution, the primary form of reparation, can only be provided where it is 
‘materially possible’ and where it is not an unproportionate burden 
compared to compensation. Compensation is only provided for damage 
‘financially assessable’ and is further limited by ‘notions of proximity.’192
 
 
Damage too remote may not be compensated. Assessing causation, causal 
uncertainty and foreseeability of harm results in the actual compensation not 
simply being based on objective damage, but also to what degree the 
defendant state anticipated the harm, abated it, and finally to what extent the 
plaintiff state contributed to the damage. Despite reparation being a binding 
legal obligation it is, similar to adaptation in the UNFCCC, far from 
unconditional.   
Reparation according to the ILC can only be made if the situation that 
existed before the wrong can be materially reestablished, or if the damage 
caused is financially assessable. As discussed above, not only climate 
change damage, but environmental damage in general challenges the notion 
that damage is ‘financially assessable’ or can be materially possible to 
restitute. Therefore, irreversible damage according to the ILC can only be 
made good by compensation assuming that the damage is financially 
assessable. Damage which is neither materially possible to restitute nor 
financially assessable will not be covered by reparation according to the 
ILC.  
 
Adaptation measures, according to the Cancun adaptation framework, are 
aimed ‘at reducing vulnerability and building resilience.’193
 
 Adaptation 
measures are therefore aimed not a removing the damage caused, but rather 
to mitigate the effects of that damage. Furthermore, adaptation measures do 
not wait to be taken when the damage has already arisen, but are taken 
preventively to ‘reduce’ the damage. Adaptation in the UNFCCC can 
therefore be seen as acknowledging that climate change damage will in 
many respects be irreversible.  
Can irreversible damage which in not financially assessable be repaired 
under customary law? There is no clear answer. Such damage might require 
new or different legal approaches. The Gabcikovo Nagymaros case suggests 
that in cases of irreversible damage that cannot be financially assessable a 
preventive approach is necessitated instead.  The court asserted that 
‘vigilance and prevention’ are required in light of the ‘irreversible character 
                                               
191  Permanent Court of International (PCIJ) Series A no. 17, p 47.  
192  See above discussion in section 3. 
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of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very 
mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.’194  Through this assertion, 
the court promotes an anticipatory approach, an approach requiring 
preventive action not unlike the objective of adaptation. Brunne concludes 
that in the Gabcikovo Nagymaros case the ICJ ‘gives a nod to the idea of 
precaution but does not endorse the precautionary principle.’195 The 
preventive approach does not wait to regulate damage after it has occurred 
but requires action to be taken to minimize anticipated damage. The court 
continued by stating ‘new norms have to be taken into consideration, not 
only when States contemplate new activities but also when continuing with 
activities begun in the past.’196
 
  
As discussed above, adaptation funding under the UNFCCC  is entirely 
dependent on voluntary contributions. The GEF provides funding for either 
‘incremental’ or ‘additional’ cost. These two concepts along with the 
concept of global benefit have in practice resulted in an adaptation funding 
policy which does not match actual adaptation needs.197
 
  
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility, one of the key 
guidelines in the UNFCCC  is mentioned in direct connection to adaptation 
in article 4.4. Nevertheless, it does not govern the adaptation funding 
structure to any tangible extent. The only provision in which the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility takes enforceable shape is article 
4.3.198 As discussed in the section on environmental principles, the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibility does not regulate conduct 
between states.199
 
 
No indication of a legal obligation for Annex Two countries to fund 
adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change is provided under the 
current regime.200
 
 However, the conditionality of adaptation funding 
scheme, and the leverage donors have under the GEF structure is not 
necessarily a misfit with reparation as of the ILC draft articles. Even if a 
reparative obligation is established according to international law, the 
obligation is neither unconditional nor unrestricted as discussed in the 
section on reparation.   
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Another interesting correlation between reparation and adaptation in the 
UNFCCC, is causation and incremental and additional cost. Establishing 
what human induced climate change is, is central to establish causation and 
estimate incremental and additional cost. As of today, there exists no 
scientific measurement to distinguish global causes from local causes for 
particular manifestations of climate change.  Hence, only funding adaptation 
to anthropogenic climate change seems an impossible task.   
 
The central role such estimation nevertheless plays appears to be an 
institutional obstacle for adaptation funding purposes. Actual adaptation 
needs seem to stretch the fabric of not only the notions of reparation 
according to the ILC, but also GEF funding criteria. Central to both 
adaptation in the UNFCCC framework and compensation in the ILC context 
is separating anthropogenic climate change from non-anthropogenic climate 
change. As a result, both concepts seem to struggle with the same problem; 
determining damage or need based on linear models of causality. As 
discussed in the section on compensation, specific causation in the context 
of climate change is problematic since many factors, including the plaintiff 
state’s own contribution to climate change, might have caused the damage. 
Grossman contrasts climate change litigation to tort claims involving 
asbestos-and explains that ‘unlike those cases, the complexity of the climate 
system means that several factors are involved in producing climatic 
phenomena, making it difficult to show the probability that defendants' 
contributions to anthropogenic climate change caused any particular 
phenomenon.’201
 
  
Furthermore, ‘the chaotic system underlying climatic effects makes it quite 
difficult to differentiate a particular pattern change in temperature or sea 
level caused by anthropogenic climate change from one caused by natural 
variability.’202  As discussed above, specific causation relates to the problem 
of joint versus individual responsibility. 203
 
 
The Trail Smelter award is interesting in light of Nollkaempers suggestion 
that compensation for climate change should be paired with commitments to 
also prevent future damage. The arbitration tribunal required Canada to 
compensate the US for its damages, cease the activities that caused damage 
on U.S. territory and set up a stricter regime for the smelter.204
                                               
201  Grossman, Warming up tot the not so radical idea: tort based climate 
change litigation, Columbia journal of environmental law, p.24, 2003, no. 28 issue 1. 
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deducted a preventive obligation from its conclusion that damage had in fact 
occurred on U.S. territory, and that such damage would continue to arise 
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unless the Smelter was subject to some regime of control.205
 
  The award in 
Trail Smelter thus indicates the futility of awarding monetary compensation 
without requiring that measures should be taken to prevent more of the 
compensated damage from arising.  
However, climate change damage, as opposed to the damage in the Trail 
Smelter award, does not arise from one distinct source. As discussed, 
causation is difficult to establish because of the many sources giving rise to 
the same damage. Nevertheless, in light of the Trail Smelter Award 
Noellkampers suggestion appears legally realistic.   
 
In light of the above discussion adaptation under the UNFCCC starts to 
position itself to reparation in new ways.  The objective of reparation and 
adaptation are partially similar. Reparation entails to ‘as far as possible’ 
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act so as to reestablish the 
situation which would have existed had the act not been committed.206 In 
short, to minimize the consequences of the illegal act. The three forms of 
reparation and the order in which they are considered, with restitution being 
the primary and compensation the secondary form, reflect this approach. 
Although adaptation is not defined in the UNFCCC framework, adaptation 
measures are focused on adverse effects, namely ‘changes…resulting from 
climate change which have significant deleterious effects.’207  Moreover, 
adaptation is recognized as crucial because limiting emission levels will not 
combat the adverse affects of climate change.208
 
   Against this backdrop, the 
objective of adaptation in the UNFCCC is to prevent and minimize damage 
caused by climate change. Similarly, reparation entails to wipe out the 
consequences of the illegal act as far as possible. In other words, minimize 
the consequences of the illegal act.  
Could adaptation under the UNFCCC framework be a possible development 
of reparation under international customary law?  There are indeed several 
factors that reconcile adaptation under the UNFCCC framework with 
international environmental law principles and reparation as of the ILC draft 
articles on state responsibility. Adaptation is not provided on an 
unconditional basis and neither is compensation unconditional. Perhaps 
more importantly, the objective of adaptation in the UNFCCC framework is 
similar to the objective of reparation, namely to minimize the consequences 
of the harmful/ illegal act.  Furthermore, the ICJs conclusion in the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case and the award in the Trail Smelter arbitration 
indicate a promotion by a preventive approach. This preventive approach 
can be seen as necessitated by the inability of traditional notions of 
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reparation, such as restitution and compensation, to address irreversible 
damage. In this regard, the precautionary principle could be of central 
importance.   
 
Is the concept of adaptation in light of international environmental legal 
development a logical extension of the precautionary principle and 
preventive approach? Perhaps yes. Whereas adaptation has incorporated the 
irreversible nature of climate change damage, reparation in the ILC context 
has not.  Reparation according to the ILC rests on the assumption that 
damage can or should be assessed financially.209 This becomes a problem in 
the context of climate change damage. The precautionary principle is 
perhaps the only principle equipped to deal with the legal challenges of non 
financially assessable irreversible damage. With an emerging understanding 
of the interdependence between human activities and the ecosystem, new 
concerns, such as the concept of common concern, have paved way for a 
preventive rather than simply reparative obligation.210
 
 A preventive 
approach recognizes the irreversible damage and the notion of reparation’s 
inability to adequately address such concerns.  
However, many factors resist the conclusion that adaption could constitute a 
form of reparation. The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility provides little guidance in this regard as it is not recognized as 
a rule of conduct between states.211Most importantly, state reluctance to 
fund adaptation and set up a mandatory funding scheme illustrates the lack 
of state practice and opinion juris needed to establish customary law. 
Furthermore, the polluter pays principle does not provide a basis from 
which to establish an obligation to fund adaptation between states. 212
  
 
Adaptation funding under the UNFCCC is presently voluntary. Establishing 
a legal obligation to compensate climate change damage is a controversial 
question in itself. Claiming that adaptation could be a form of reparation is 
perhaps relevant only when such an obligation can be established.   
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6 Conclusion 
Perhaps the true magnitude of future adaptation needs have not yet fully 
been understood scientifically nor legally. The GEF funding mechanism is 
not set up to cover the full adaptation cost. It is sometimes, as seen through 
the LDCF only granting up to 200.000 USD, not mandated to grant more 
than a particular sum to individual states. The objective of the UNFCCC is 
to achieve stabilization of green house gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
The UNFCCC is primarily designed to abate anthropogenic climate change.   
Adaptation funding under the GEF mechanism, entrusted to the GEF, 
provides funding in accordance with the criteria of incremental or additional 
cost. These two concepts rest on the assumption that it is possible to 
distinguish between non anthropogenic and anthropogenic climate change. 
However, presently there exists no scientific instrument to separate the 
adverse effects of climate change from natural climate variability. Climate 
change will give rise to new kinds of damages that inherently cannot be 
materially restituted or easily financially estimated. Adaptation needs will 
only continue to increase. If funding under the UNFCCC will not suffice to 
meet adaptation needs, how is adaptation in the UNFCCC then to be 
conceptualized in relation to established concepts of reparation such as 
compensation?   
  
This investigation has shown that adaptation in the UNFCCC has similar 
features to that of reparative obligations according to the ILC draft articles 
on State responsibility.  Most importantly, the objective of reparation 
according to the ILC is to wipe out as far as possible the consequences of 
the illegal act and the objective of adaptation is the same, apart from the 
concept of adaptation in the UNFCCC incorporation of irreversible damage. 
Furthermore, compensation according to the ILC is restricted to what is 
financially assessable; adaptation similarly is based on a purely economic 
estimation. However, adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change, as 
well as environmental damage in general challenges the notion that damage 
can be compensated financially.  
 
How does international customary law address irreversible non financially 
assessable damage? Developments in International Environmental law 
emphasizing a preventive rather than reparative obligation, such as the 
precautionary principle, are paving way for a novel approach to reparation. 
The Stockholm declaration, containing the precautionary principle and the 
concept of common concern, and the Rio declaration, containing the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility, could perhaps be seen 
as the beginning of a normative process. In such a paradigm prevention 
rather than reparation as we know it today is central. An obligation to fund 
adaptation, as a form of reparation, would arguably be seen as an extension 
of the precautionary principle. As of today however, lack of opinion juris 
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and state practice of funding for adaptation indicate that such a development 
of the precautionary principle is still distant. 
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